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Introduction
“Jane” allowed her ex-boyfriend to photograph her naked because, as he assured her, it would be for his eyes only. 1  After
their breakup, he betrayed her trust. 2  On a popular “revenge porn” site, he uploaded her naked photo along with her contact
information. 3  Jane received e-mails, calls, and Facebook friend requests from strangers, many of whom wanted sex. 4
According to the officers, nothing could be done because her ex had not violated her state's criminal harassment law. 5  One
post was an isolated event, not a harassing course of conduct as required by the law. 6  Also, her ex had not threatened her or
solicited others to stalk her. 7  If Jane's ex had secretly photographed her, he might *346  have faced prosecution for publishing
the illegally obtained image. 8  In her state, however, it was legal to publish Jane's naked photo taken with her consent even
though her consent was premised on the promise the photo would remain private. 9
Nonconsensual pornography 10  involves the distribution of sexually graphic images of individuals without their consent.
This includes images originally obtained without consent (e.g., hidden recordings or recordings of sexual assaults) as well
as images originally obtained with consent, usually within the context of a private or confidential relationship (e.g., images
consensually given to an intimate partner who later distributes them without consent, popularly referred to as “revenge porn”).
Because the term “revenge porn” is used so frequently as shorthand for all forms of nonconsensual pornography, we will use
it interchangeably with nonconsensual porn.
Publishing Jane's nude photo without her consent was an egregious privacy violation that deserves criminal punishment.
Criminalizing privacy invasions is not new. In their groundbreaking article The Right to Privacy, published in 1890, Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis argued that “[i]t would doubtless be desirable that the privacy of the individual should receive the
added protection of the criminal law.” 11
Over the past hundred years, state and federal legislators have taken Warren and Brandeis's advice and criminalized many
privacy invasions. The Privacy Act of 1974 includes criminal penalties for the disclosure of agency records containing
individually identifiable information to any person or agency not entitled to receive it. 12  Federal laws against identity theft
criminalize, inter alia, the transfer or use of another person's means of identification in connection with any state felony or
violation of federal law. 13  Federal laws prohibit the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information. 14  The
federal Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 bans intentionally recording or broadcasting an image of another person in a
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state of undress without that *347  person's consent under circumstances in which the person enjoys a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 15  Many state voyeurism laws criminalize the viewing or recording of a person's intimate parts without permission. 16
Why, then, are there so few laws banning nonconsensual pornography to date? A combination of factors is at work: lack of
understanding about the gravity, scope, and dynamics of the problem; historical indifference and hostility to women's autonomy;
inconsistent conceptions of contextual privacy; and misunderstandings of First Amendment doctrine.
Revenge porn victims have only recently come forward to describe the grave harms they have suffered, including stalking,
loss of professional and educational opportunities, and psychological damage. As with domestic violence and sexual assault,
victims of revenge porn suffer negative consequences for speaking out, including the risk of increased harm. 17  We are only now
beginning to get a sense of how large the problem of revenge porn is now that brave, outspoken victims have opened a space for
others to tell their stories. 18  The fact that nonconsensual porn so often involves the Internet and social media, the public, law
enforcement, and the judiciary sometimes struggle to understand the mechanics of the conduct and the devastation it can cause.
Our society has a poor track record in addressing harms that take women and girls as their primary targets. Though much
progress has been made towards gender equality, much social, legal, and political power remains in the hands of men. The
fight to recognize domestic violence, sexual assault, and sexual harassment as serious issues has been long and difficult, and
the tendency to tolerate, trivialize, or dismiss these harms persists. 19  As revenge *348  porn affects women and girls far more
frequently than men and boys, and creates far more serious consequences for them, the eagerness to minimize its harm is sadly
predictable.
This disregard for harms undermining women's autonomy is closely tied to idiosyncratic, dangerous views about consent with
regard to sex. Some argue that a woman's consensual sharing of sexually explicit photos with a trusted confidant should be
taken as wide-ranging permission to share them with the public. 20  Said another way, a victim's consent in one context is taken
as consent for other contexts. That is the same kind of dangerous mentality at work in sexual assault and sexual harassment. For
years, women have had to struggle with legal and social disregard of their sexual boundaries. While most people today would
rightly recoil at the suggestion that a woman's consent to sleep with one man can be taken as consent to sleep with all of his
friends, this is the very logic of revenge porn apologists.
Outside of sexual practices, most people recognize that consent is context-specific. Privacy regulation and best practices
make clear that permitting an entity to use information in one context does not confer consent to use it in another context
without the subject's permission. 21  Individual and societal expectations of privacy are tailored to specific circumstances. 22
The nonconsensual sharing of an individual's intimate photos should be no different; consent within a trusted relationship does
not equal consent outside of that relationship. We should no more blame individuals for trusting loved ones with intimate images
than we blame someone for trusting a financial advisor not to share sensitive information with strangers on the street.
While some of the First Amendment concerns regarding anti-revenge porn laws are valid, many of them reflect the tendency
to treat sexual autonomy, especially women's sexual autonomy, as a *349  category less deserving of respect than other social
values. As scholars like Frederick Schauer 23  and Neil Richards 24  have pointed out, many regulations of speech and expression
proceed without any strident First Amendment objections, including fraud, trade secrets, and product labeling.
In this Article we make the case for the direct criminalization of nonconsensual pornography. Current civil law remedies,
including copyright remedies, are an ineffective deterrent to revenge porn. If they were, we would likely not be witnessing the
rise in reports of victimization as well as the proliferation in revenge porn websites. According to attorney Mitchell Matorin,
who has represented revenge porn victims, “In the real world, civil lawsuits are no remedy at all.” 25  Among the reasons that
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civil litigation is ineffective is the fact that even a successful suit cannot stop the spread of an image already disclosed, and
most disclosers know they are unlikely ever to be sued. Most victims do not have either the time or money to bring claims,
and litigation may make little sense even for those who can afford to sue if perpetrators have few assets. While perpetrators
may have little fear of civil litigation or copyright claims, the threat of criminal penalties is a different matter. Since criminal
convictions in most cases stay on one's record forever, they are much less likely to be ignored. While some existing criminal
laws can be mobilized against revenge porn, on the whole, existing criminal laws simply do not effectively address the issue.
Criminalizing nonconsensual pornography is also appropriate and necessary to convey the proper level of social condemnation
for this behavior. Given that a response from the criminal justice system is essential, we hope to help lawmakers interested in
drafting such laws. We offer our suggestions for drafting revenge porn legislation that would comport with the First Amendment
and Due Process concerns.
This Article will unfold as follows. Part I responds to faulty assumptions that have obscured a full view of the damage that
revenge pornography inflicts. It corrects misunderstandings about consent that have prevented us from criminalizing revenge
porn. Part II explores why civil law alone cannot effectively address nonconsensual pornography. Part III assesses the criminal
law *350  landscape. It discusses the deficits of current criminal law. Then, it considers current legislative proposals to prohibit
revenge porn. Part IV responds to First Amendment concerns. Part V offers our recommendations.
I. Myths About Revenge Porn
This Part has two objectives. The first is to debunk the notion that the harm revenge porn inflicts is trivial. Lawmakers are
unlikely to mobilize against nonconsensual pornography without a full appreciation of its harms. The second goal is to tackle
society's current inability to understand the contextual nature of consent when it comes to matters of sexual privacy and
autonomy. Privacy law and scholarship has recognized the importance of context in evaluating consent, and social norms reflect
this insight. The same should be true for matters of intimate sexual conduct.
A. Understanding Revenge Porn's Damage
In 2007, a man allegedly made numerous copies of DVDs of his ex-girlfriend performing sex acts and distributed them on
random car windshields, along with the woman's name, address, and phone number. 26  He was angry that the woman had
broken off their relationship. 27  The woman, who had not known that the intimate acts had been recorded, began receiving
visits and phone calls from strange men who took the video as a sexual proposition. 28
Today, intimate photos are increasingly being distributed online, potentially reaching thousands, even millions of people, with
a click of a mouse. A person's nude photo can be uploaded to a website where thousands of people can view and repost it. In
short order, the image can appear prominently in a search of the victim's name. It can be e-mailed or otherwise exhibited to
the victim's family, employers, coworkers, and friends. The Internet provides a staggering means of amplification, extending
the reach of content in unimaginable ways.
Revenge porn's serious consequences warrant its criminalization. Nonconsensual pornography raises the risk of offline stalking
and physical attack. In a study of 1,244 individuals, over 50% of victims reported that their naked photos appeared next to their
full name and social network profile; over 20% of victims reported that their e-mail addresses and telephone numbers *351
appeared next to their naked photos. 29  Posting naked images next to a person's contact information often encourages strangers
to confront the person offline. Many revenge porn victims like Jane rightly worry that anonymous callers and e-mailers would
follow up on their sexual demands in person.
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Victims' fear can be profound. They do not feel safe leaving their homes. Jane, for example, did not go to work for days after
she discovered the postings. 30  Hollie Toups, a thirty-three-year-old teacher's aide, explained that she was afraid to leave her
home after someone posted her nude photograph, home address, and Facebook profile on a porn site. 31  “I don't want to go out
alone,” she explained, “because I don't know what might happen.” 32
Victims struggle especially with anxiety, and some suffer panic attacks. Anorexia nervosa and depression are common ailments
for individuals who are harassed online. 33  Researchers have found that cyber harassment victims' anxiety grows more severe
over time. 34  Victims have difficulty thinking positive thoughts and doing their work. According to a study conducted by the
Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, over 80% of revenge porn victims experience severe emotional distress and anxiety. 35
Revenge porn is often a form of domestic violence. Frequently, the intimate images are themselves the result of an abuser's
coercion of a reluctant partner. 36  In numerous cases, abusers have threatened to disclose intimate images of their partners
when victims attempt to leave the relationship. 37  Abusers use the threat of disclosure to keep their partners under their control,
making good on the threat once their partners find the courage to leave.
*352  The professional costs of revenge porn are steep. Because Internet searches of victims' names prominently display their
naked images or videos, many lose their jobs. Schools have terminated teachers whose naked pictures appeared online. A
government agency ended a woman's employment after a coworker circulated her nude photograph to colleagues. 38
Victims may be unable to find work at all. Most employers rely on candidates' online reputations as an employment screen.
According to a 2009 study commissioned by Microsoft, nearly 80% of employers consult search engines to collect intelligence
on job applicants, and, about 70% of the time, they reject applicants due to their findings. 39  Common reasons for not
interviewing and hiring applicants include concerns about their “lifestyle,” “inappropriate” online comments, and “unsuitable”
photographs, videos, and information about them. 40
Recruiters do not contact victims to see if they posted the nude photos of themselves or if someone else did in violation of
their trust. The “simple but regrettable truth is that after consulting search results, employers don't call revenge porn victims
to schedule” interviews or to extend offers. 41  Employers do not want to hire individuals whose search results might reflect
poorly on the employer. 42
To avoid further abuse, targeted individuals withdraw from online activities, which can be costly in many respects. Closing down
one's blog can mean a loss of income and other career opportunities. 43  In some fields, blogging is key to getting a job. *353
According to technology blogger Robert Scoble, people who do not blog are “never going to be included in the [technology]
industry.” 44  When victims shut down their profiles on social media platforms like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter, they are
saddled with low social media influence scores that can impair their ability to obtain employment. 45  Companies like Klout
measure people's online influence by looking at their number of social media followers, updates, likes, retweets, and shares.
Not uncommonly, employers refuse to hire individuals with low social media influence scores. 46
Aside from these traditional harms, revenge porn can also amount to a degrading form of sexual harassment. It exposes victims'
sexuality in humiliating ways. Victims' naked photos appear on slut-shaming 47  sites, such as Cheaterville.com and MyEx.com.
Once their naked images are exposed, anonymous strangers can send e-mail messages that threaten rape. Some have said: “First
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I will rape you, then I'll kill you.” 48  Victims internalize these frightening and demeaning messages. 49  Women would more
likely suffer harm as a result of the posting of their naked images than their male counterparts. Gender stereotypes help explain
why--women would be seen as immoral sluts for engaging in sexual activity, whereas men's sexual activity is generally a point
of pride. 50
While nonconsensual pornography can affect both men and women, empirical evidence indicates that nonconsensual
pornography primarily affects women and girls. In a study conducted by the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, 90% of those
victimized by revenge porn were female. 51  Nonconsensual pornography, like rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment,
belongs to the category of violence that violates legal and social commitments to equality. It denies women and girls control
over their own bodies and lives. Not only does it inflict serious and, in many cases, irremediable injury on individual victims,
it constitutes a vicious form of sex discrimination.
*354  Revenge porn is a form of cyber harassment and cyber stalking whose victims are predominantly female. 52  The U.S.
National Violence Against Women Survey reports that 60% of cyber stalking victims are women. 53  For over a decade, Working
to Halt Online Abuse (“WHOA”) has collected information from cyber harassment victims. Of the 3,787 individuals reporting
cyber harassment to WHOA from 2000 to 2012, 72.5% were female, 22.5% were male, and 5% were unknown. 54  A victim's
actual or perceived sexual orientation seems to play a role as well. Research suggests that sexual minorities are more vulnerable
to cyber harassment than heterosexuals. 55
B. The Consent Conundrum
Consensual sharing of intimate images is often done with the implied or express understanding that such images will remain
confidential. As revenge porn victims have told us time and again, they shared their explicit images or permitted the naked
photos to be taken because, and only because, their partners assured them that the explicit images would be kept confidential.
Nonetheless, the public tends to have difficulty recognizing the significance of such implied confidences in sexual contexts.
Critics resist the criminalization of revenge porn on the grounds that consensual sharing in one context--a trusted relationship--
translates into consent in other contexts-- posting to the world. That understanding of consent not only runs against widely
shared intuitions about other activities but also against the insights of privacy law and scholarship.
*355  Consent to share information in one context does not serve as consent to share this information in another context. When
a person gives her credit card to a waiter, she is not consenting to let the waiter use that card to make personal purchases. When
a person entrusts a doctor with sensitive health information, he is not authorizing that doctor to share that information with the
public. What lovers share with each other is not equivalent to what they share with coworkers, acquaintances, or employers.
Consent is contextual; it is not an on/off switch.
Consent's contextual nature is a staple of information privacy law. A core teaching of the Fair Information Practice Principles
is that sharing information for one purpose is not permission to share for other uses. 56  Policymakers have long recognized the
importance of context to the sharing of sensitive information. Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to ensure that the
trust of financial institutions' customers would not be betrayed. 57  With few exceptions, financial institutions cannot share their
customers' financial information with third parties. 58  Similarly, the Video Privacy Protection Act recognizes that individuals
may be willing to share their preferences for certain kinds of films with their video providers but not with the world at large. 59
These laws recognize the contextual nature of consent--disclosing information to one entity does not signal consent to pass
it on to others. 60
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In its recent report, “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change,” the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) laid out
best privacy practices principles for private entities. 61  A key recommendation was the recognition that a consumer's consent to
share information in one context does not translate into consent to share that information in other contexts. 62  In instances where
*356  consumers would not expect their information to be shared with third parties, companies should ask consumers for their
permission for such sharing. 63  As the FTC underscored, when data is collected for one purpose and then treated differently,
the failure to respect the original expectation is a cognizable harm. 64
The FTC's report resonates with the work of privacy scholars. In her book Privacy in Context, Helen Nissenbaum argues that
privacy is not a binary concept. 65  Information is neither wholly private nor wholly public. Context and social norms determine
the question. A person, for instance, might be willing to share personal information with her doctor but not her employer.
As Joel Reidenberg has argued, using data for a purpose other than the one the subject has permitted should be considered a
cognizable harm. 66
Lior Strahilevitz's social network theory of privacy explains that information may deserve privacy protection even if it is shared
with a significant number of people. 67  A group's internal norms of information disclosure play a key role in determinations
about privacy expectations. For example, an HIV-positive person who told family, friends, and a support group about his HIV
status did not extinguish his privacy interest in the information because the norm was that it would not be revealed with others
who knew him or to the public at large. 68  Daniel Solove's pragmatic conception of privacy envisions context as central to
understanding and addressing contemporary privacy problems. 69
As privacy law and literature suggest, consent is situational. Revenge porn victims share sexually explicit photographs of
themselves with others based on the understanding that the photos remain confidential. Sharing sensitive information, whether
a nude photo, Social Security number, or HIV status, with a confidant does not mean one has waived all privacy expectation
in the information. 70
*357  II. The Inadequacy of Civil Actions
Some commentators oppose regulatory proposals based on the argument that existing civil remedies can ably address revenge
porn. 71  Unfortunately, that is not the case. Civil law can offer modest deterrence and remedy, but practical concerns often
render them more theoretical than real. As this Part concludes, more effective disincentives for nonconsensual pornography are
needed than what civil actions can provide.
A. Tort Law
In theory, tort law reaches some of the harm suffered by revenge porn victims. Victims could sue for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, recovering for severe emotional suffering intentionally or recklessly caused. Individuals are not expected to
tolerate cruel invasions of their privacy that are extreme and outrageous. 72  The privacy tort of public disclosure of private fact
could provide relief. Key to this tort is the public's lack of a legitimate interest in the disclosed information. Publishing a private
person's nude photos online is not a matter that legitimately concerns the public. 73  Courts have recognized public disclosure
claims where the plaintiff shared private information with one other trusted person. 74
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Revenge porn victims have brought tort claims and won. A woman sued her ex-boyfriend after he posted her nude photographs
on twenty-three adult websites next to her contact information and alleged interest in a “visit or phone call.” 75  Her ex created
an online advertisement that said she wanted “no strings attached” masochistic sex. 76  Strange men left her frightening voice
mails. 77  *358  The woman suffered anxiety and a bout of shingles. 78  She worried the abuse would impact her security
clearance at work. 79  A judge awarded the woman $425,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and
public disclosure of private fact. 80
One major problem, however, is that most victims lack resources to bring civil suits. As we have heard from countless victims,
many cannot afford to sue their perpetrators. Having lost their jobs due to the online posts, they cannot pay their rent, let alone
cover lawyer's fees. It may also be hard to find lawyers willing to take their cases. Most lawyers do not know this area of law
and are not prepared to handle the trickiness of online harassment evidence. This reduces the deterrent effect of civil litigation,
as would-be perpetrators are unlikely to fear a course of action that is unlikely to materialize.
What is more, since plaintiffs in civil court generally have to proceed under their real names, victims may be reluctant to sue
for fear of unleashing more unwanted publicity. Generally, courts disfavor pseudonymous litigation because it is assumed to
interfere with the transparency of the judicial process, to deny a defendant's constitutional right to confront his or her accuser, and
to encourage frivolous claims from being asserted by those whose names and reputations would not be on the line. Arguments
in favor of Jane Doe lawsuits are considered against the presumption of public openness-a heavy presumption that often works
against plaintiffs asserting privacy invasions. 81
Even in ideal circumstances, where pseudonymous litigation is permitted and where a lawyer is willing to take the case, it may
be hard to recover much in the way of damages. Defendants often do not have deep pockets. Victims may be hard pressed to
expend their time and money on lawsuits if defendants are effectively judgment proof. Then too, an award of damages is no
assurance that websites will comply with requests to take down the images. The removal of *359  images is the outcome that
most victims desire above all else, and civil litigation may be unable to make that happen. 82
Some argue that in cases where individual perpetrators are judgment proof, victims can bring claims against the websites
that publish revenge porn and in turn drive the demand for it. Generally speaking, site operators are immunized from tort
liability related to a third party's content. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides, “No provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.” 83  Courts have interpreted § 230 to largely immunize from liability website owners and operators for tortious
material submitted by third-party users. 84  According to § 230, “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section,” which indicates that the statute trumps civil and
criminal state laws. 85  If a user hacks into a person's computer to obtain sexually explicit photographs and submits the photos,
unsolicited, to a revenge porn website, the site owner would not be liable for displaying it. 86
B. Copyright Law
Copyright law can seem like a promising avenue for redress because § 230 does not immunize websites from federal intellectual
property claims. 87  If a victim took the image herself then she would *360  be considered the copyright owner. In that case,
the victim could file a § 512 notice after registering the copyright. 88  The site operator would have to take down the allegedly
infringing content promptly or lose their immunity under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 89
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Even if the victim took the photo herself, however, her right to sue for a copyright violation may be illusory. Revenge porn
sites often ignore requests for removal because they are not worried about being sued. They know that most victims cannot
afford to hire a lawyer.
If a victim did not take the sexually explicit photo herself, she does not own the copyright--it belongs to the photographer. Some
lawyers and scholars have suggested that an expansive conception of joint authorship might cover these victims, 90  but this
theory is untested and may prove to have little traction. 91
In any event, even successful copyright actions cannot put the genie back in the bottle. Once an image is released, getting
it removed from one site does not mean that it will be removed from every other site to which it has migrated. Even more
importantly, the suggestion that copyright law is an adequate response to nonconsensual porn mischaracterizes the harm as one
of property rights. While copyright remedies can certainly exist alongside and supplement other avenues of redress for victims,
the harm involved in nonconsensual pornography cannot be reduced to a property claim. 92
C. Sexual Harassment Law
Does revenge porn constitute actionable sexual harassment? As defined by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
sexual harassment includes “[u] nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature.” 93  Under current law, protections against sexual harassment have little force outside of employment and
educational settings. 94  Accordingly, while nonconsensual pornography that is *361  produced, distributed, or accessed by
a victim's coworkers, employers, school officials, or fellow students raises the possibility of a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 95  or Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 96  such
claims would not be available to address nonconsensual pornography falling outside of this narrow category.
As this discussion shows, civil law cannot meaningfully deter and redress revenge porn. We now turn to the potential for a
criminal law response.
III. Criminal Law's Potential to Combat Revenge Porn
A criminal law solution is essential to deter judgment-proof perpetrators. As attorney and revenge porn expert Erica Johnstone
puts it, “Even if people aren't afraid of being sued because they have nothing to lose, they are afraid of being convicted of a crime
because that shows up on their record forever.” 97  Nonconsensual pornography's rise is surely related to the fact that malicious
actors have little incentive to refrain from such behavior. While some critics believe that existing criminal law adequately
addresses nonconsensual pornography, this Part highlights how existing criminal law fails to address most cases of revenge porn.
A. The Importance of Criminal Law
Criminal law has long prohibited privacy invasions and certain violations of autonomy. Criminal law is essential to send the
clear message to potential perpetrators that nonconsensual pornography *362  inflicts grave privacy and autonomy harms that
have real consequences and penalties. 98
While we share general concerns about overcriminalization and overincarceration, rejecting the criminalization of serious harms
is not the way to address those concerns. To argue that our society should not criminalize certain behavior because too many
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other kinds of behavior are already criminalized is at best a non sequitur. Only the shallowest of thinkers would suggest that
the question whether nonconsensual pornography should be criminalized-indeed, whether any conduct should be criminalized-
should turn on something as contingent and arbitrary as the number of existing laws. Rather, the question of criminalization
should be a question about the seriousness of the harm caused and whether such harm is adequately conceptualized as a harm
only to individuals, for which tort remedies are sufficient, or should be conceptualized as a harm to both individuals and society
as a whole for which civil penalties are not adequate, thus warranting criminal penalties. 99
We are also sensitive to objections that criminalizing revenge porn might reinforce the harmful and erroneous perception
that women should be ashamed of their bodies or their sexual activities, but maintain that recognizing and protecting sexual
autonomy does exactly the opposite. 100  A criminal law solution would send the message that individuals' bodies are their own
and that society recognizes the grave harms that flow from turning individuals into objects of pornography without their consent.
In this way, a criminal law approach will help us conceptualize the nonconsensual publication of someone's sexually explicit
images as a form of sexual abuse. When sexual abuse is inflicted on an individual's physical body, it is considered rape or
sexual assault. The fact that nonconsensual pornography does not involve physical contact does not change the fact that it is a
form of sexual abuse. As *363  Supreme Court Justice Horace Gray wrote in 1891, “The inviolability of the person is as much
invaded by a compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one . . . to lay bare the body, or to submit it to
the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass . . . .” 101  Federal and state criminal
laws regarding voyeurism demonstrate that physical contact is not necessary to cause great harm and suffering. 102
Video voyeurism laws punish the nonconsensual recording of a person in a state of undress in places where individuals enjoy
a reasonable expectation of privacy. 103  Criminal laws prohibiting voyeurism rest on the commonly accepted assumption
that observing a person in a state of undress or engaged in sexual activity without that person's consent not only inflicts
dignitary harms upon the individual observed, but also inflicts a social harm serious enough to warrant criminal prohibition
and punishment.
International criminal law provides precedent and perspective on this issue. Both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) have employed a definition of sexual
violence that does not require physical contact. In both tribunals, forced nudity was found to be a form of sexual violence. 104
In the Akayesu case, the ICTR found that “[s]exual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may
include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.” 105  In the Furundzija case, the ICTY similarly found
that international criminal law punishes not only rape, but also “all serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted upon the physical
and moral integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat of force or intimidation in a way that is degrading and humiliating
for the victim's dignity.” 106
The legal and social condemnation of child pornography exemplifies our collective understanding that the viewing and
distribution-not just production-of certain kinds of sexual images *364  are harmful. In New York v. Ferber, 107  the United
States Supreme Court recognized that the distribution of child pornography is distinct from the underlying crime of the
sexual abuse of children. 108  The Court observed that “[t]he distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity
by juveniles . . . [is] a permanent record of the children's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their
circulation.” 109  When images and videos of sexual assaults and surreptitious observation are distributed and consumed, they
inflict further harms on the victims and on society connected to, but distinct from, the criminal acts to which the victims were
originally subjected. 110  The trafficking of this material increases the demand for images and videos that exploit the individuals
portrayed. This is why the Court in Ferber held that it is necessary to shut down the “distribution network” of child pornography
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to reduce the sexual exploitation of children: “The most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may
be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise
promoting the product.” 111
Nonconsensual pornography raises similar concerns. Disclosing sexually explicit images without permission can have lasting
and destructive consequences. Victims often internalize socially imposed shame and humiliation every time they see them and
every time they think that others are viewing them.
Consider the experience of sports reporter Erin Andrews. After a stalker secretly taped her while she undressed in her hotel
room, he posted as many as ten videos of her online. 112  Google Trends data suggested that just after the release of the videos,
much of the nation began looking for some variation of “Erin Andrews peephole video.” 113  Nearly nine months later, Andrews
explained, “I haven't stopped being victimized--I'm going to have to live with this forever . . . . When I have kids and they have
kids, I'll have to *365  explain to them why this is on the Internet.” 114  She further lamented that when she walks into football
stadiums to report on a game, she faces the taunts of fans who have seen her naked online. 115  She explained that she “felt like
[she] was continuing to be victimized” each time she talked about it. 116
Andrews's experience is echoed by that of Lena Chen, who allowed her ex-boyfriend to take pictures of them having sex. 117
After he betrayed her trust and posted the pictures online, the pictures went viral. 118  As Chen explained, feeling ashamed of
her sexuality was not something that came naturally to her, but it is now something she knows inside and out. 119  Victims of
nonconsensual pornography are harmed each time a person views or shares their intimate images.
B. Current Criminal Law's Limits
Existing federal and state criminal laws have limited application to the initial posters of nonconsensual pornography and the
laws have even less force with regard to site operators. This Subpart first explores the potential of criminal harassment statutes
in pursuing the original discloser. Then, it turns to the possibility of extortion and child pornography charges against revenge
porn site operators.
1. Punishing Original Disclosers Under Criminal Law
Many scholars believe that existing criminal law adequately addresses revenge porn. Professor Eric Goldman, for instance,
argues that criminal harassment laws punish the distribution of sexually explicit images when there is intent to harm, but that
is not always true. 120  Two potential hurdles stand in the way.
The first hurdle is that criminal harassment and stalking laws only apply to defendants who engage in repeated harassing acts.
The federal cyber stalking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, bans as a felony the use of any “interactive computer service” to engage
in a *366  “course of conduct” intended to harass or intimidate someone in another state that either places that person in
reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death or that would reasonably be expected to cause the person to suffer “substantial
emotional distress.” 121
A single posting of someone's name, address, and sexually explicit image can cause serious damage but would not amount to a
harassing “course of conduct.” A revenge porn post can go viral, but the poster who started the cascade could evade harassment
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charges. As Jane's experience attests, a single post, e-mail, or other disclosure of nonconsensual pornography can cause grave
harm. 122
The second problem is that some state harassment laws only apply to persistent abuse communicated directly to victims. A
New York state court recently dismissed charges against a man who posted his ex-girlfriend's nude photos on Twitter and sent
the photos to the woman's employer and sister. 123  The court justified its dismissal of the aggravated harassment charge on the
grounds that the man had not sent the nude photos to the woman herself, but rather to others. 124  Revenge porn posted on third-
party sites would not be banned under harassment statutes that require direct contact with victims. 125
Even when revenge porn does fit the definition of criminal harassment, police may decline to get involved. Victims are often
told that the behavior is not serious enough for an in-depth *367  investigation. 126  “They are shooed away because, officers
say, they are to blame for the whole mess, since they chose to share their intimate pictures.” 127
Consider Holly Jacobs's case. Hundreds of porn and revenge porn sites featured her nude images next to her work biography and
e-mail address. 128  Some posts falsely claimed that she would have sex for money and that she had slept with her students. 129
Law enforcement officers told her that because she voluntarily gave the photos to her ex-boyfriend, he owned them and could
freely share them. 130
Jacobs refused to give up on the potential for criminal law. After contacting U.S. Senator Marco Rubio's office, the Florida
State Attorney's office took up her case and charged her ex with a misdemeanor count of cyber stalking. 131  Investigators traced
one of the porn posts to her ex's IP address. 132  They told Jacobs that they needed a warrant to search his computer for further
evidence because her ex had claimed that he had been hacked and denied releasing Jacobs's pictures. 133
The charges against her ex were dismissed when prosecutors decided they could not justify seeking a warrant for a misdemeanor
case. 134  Their hands were tied, they said, even though “I've been hacked” is a standard defense in cyber stalking cases. 135
Jacobs's case apparently was not serious enough for the police to obtain a warrant to search a defendant's computer or home. 136
2. Prosecuting Site Operators for Extortion and Child Pornography
What about website operators' criminal liability under current state or federal criminal law? Although § 230 immunity is broad,
it is not absolute. It exempts from its reach federal criminal law, intellectual property law, and the Electronic Communications
*368  Privacy Act. 137  As § 230(e) provides, the statute has “[n]o effect” on “any [f]ederal criminal statute” and does not
“limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.” 138
The recent federal prosecution against revenge porn site operator Hunter Moore has been invoked as support for the notion
that no new laws are needed to take on revenge porn. In December 2013, federal prosecutors indicted Moore for conspiring
to hack into people's computers to steal their nude images. 139  According to the indictment, Moore paid a computer hacker to
access women's password-protected computers and e-mail accounts to steal their nude photos for financial gain--profits from
his revenge porn site Is Anyone Up. 140
While the prosecution of Moore is cause for celebration, it is a mistake to draw from it the conclusion that existing laws are
sufficient to address revenge porn. The fact that one revenge porn site owner allegedly broke numerous federal laws in running
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a revenge porn website does not change the fact that he is facing no charges for publishing the content itself, 141  and that the
next revenge porn entrepreneur will no doubt learn not to make the same mistakes as Hunter Moore.
State prosecutors are currently pursuing extortion charges against site operators who call for posters to upload their exes' naked
images and then charge a hefty fee for the removal of those photos. 142  There is a strong argument that § 230's immunity does
not apply to those who extort victims whose predicament they have helped orchestrate. California Attorney General Kamala
Harris has brought the first cases to press the question. 143
In December 2013, the operator of revenge porn site UGotPosted, Kevin Bollaert, was indicted for extortion, conspiracy, and
identity theft in violation of California state laws. 144  The site featured the nude photos, Facebook screen shots, and contact
information of more than 10,000 individuals. 145  According to the *369  indictment, Bollaert ran the revenge porn site with
a companion takedown site, Change My Reputation. 146  When Bollaert received complaints from individuals who appeared
in nude photos, he allegedly sent them e-mails directing them to the takedown site, which charged up to $350 for the removal
of photos. 147  Attorney General Harris explained that Bollaert “published intimate photos of unsuspecting victims and turned
their public humiliation and betrayal into a commodity with the potential to devastate lives.” 148
Bollaert will likely challenge the State's identity theft charges on § 230 grounds. 149  Because California's identity theft laws
are somewhat unusual, 150  it is unclear how successful Bollaert's defense will be. He may also try to argue that charging for
the removal of user-generated photos is not tantamount to authoring or codeveloping them, that is, charging for the removal of
content is not the same as paying for or helping develop it. 151  Nonetheless, the State has a strong argument that the extortion
charges fall outside § 230's immunity because the charges hinge on what Bollaert himself did and said, not on what his users
posted.
Even if the California Attorney General's charges are dismissed on § 230 grounds, federal prosecutors could charge Bollaert
with federal criminal extortion charges. Sites that encourage cyber harassment and charge for its removal (or have a financial
arrangement with removal services) are engaging in extortion.
But of course revenge porn operators who charge for the removal of images are not the only ones hosting revenge porn. There
are countless other sites and blogs that host revenge porn that do not engage in extortion. If these criminal prosecutions are
successful, site operators will stop charging for the removal of photos and the phenomenon will still continue.
Prosecuting site operators for violating federal cyber-stalking law is even less promising than prosecuting original disclosers.
Most site operators cannot be said to have engaged in a pattern of harassing conduct vis-à-vis any given victim. They lack the
requisite intent to “kill, injure, harass, or place under surveillance *370  with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause
substantial emotional distress” a particular person. 152  Many admitted purveyors of nonconsensual pornography maintain, with
some plausibility, that their sole intention is to obtain notoriety, fulfill some sexual desire, or increase traffic for their websites.
What about child pornography laws? While “pornography” is to some degree regulated by federal criminal law, federal law
focuses almost exclusively on the age of the material's subjects. 153  Little attention is paid to individuals' consent (or lack
thereof) to be portrayed in such a manner. With regard to original perpetrators of nonconsensual pornography, both state and
federal child pornography laws can be used to deter and prosecute the production of sexually explicit material featuring underage
individuals. Section 2256 of Title 18 defines child pornography as any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a
minor (someone under eighteen years of age). 154  “Visual depictions include photographs, videos, digital or computer generated
Franks, Mary Anne 1/7/2016
For Educational Use Only
CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 345
 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 13
images indistinguishable from an actual minor, and images created, adapted, or modified, but appear to depict an identifiable,
actual minor.” 155  These provisions do not apply, of course, to victims over the age of eighteen, seriously limiting the usefulness
of these prohibitions in revenge porn cases.
One commentator contends that criminal penalties applicable to general pornographers could apply to revenge porn site
operators. 156  That is not the case. Section 2257 of Title 18 sets out recordkeeping requirements for those engaged in
“producing” pornography. 157  The statute's definition of “produces” or “producing” pornography tracks the definition of § 230
of the Communications Decency Act, which means it does not cover websites that facilitate or distribute material submitted by
third-party users. 158  The statute also focuses almost exclusively on age-verifying identification. 159  It sets out no requirements
to verify that the individuals portrayed have consented to the use of their images. While this law may provide some disincentives
for distributing nonconsensual pornography of underage individuals, it will not have any effect on the distribution of material
featuring adult victims.
*371  C. Current Efforts to Criminalize Nonconsensual Pornography
To date, New Jersey, Alaska, Texas, California, Idaho, and Utah are the only states that criminalize the nonconsensual disclosure
of someone's sexually intimate images. 160  During the writing of this Article, legislators in seventeen states have proposed
revenge porn bills. 161  We provide our thoughts on these developments, noting the strengths and weaknesses of the various
approaches and offering suggestions of our own. We reserve our views on the constitutionality of these proposals for the next
Part.
New Jersey, the first state to criminalize revenge porn, has the broadest statute, prohibiting the nonconsensual observation,
recording, or disclosure of sexually explicit images. Under New Jersey law, it is a third-degree crime 162  to post or share a
person's nude or partially nude images without that person's consent. 163  The New Jersey law provides the following:
An actor commits a crime of the third degree if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so,
he discloses any photograph, film, videotape, recording or any other reproduction of the image of another
person whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact,
unless that person has consented to such disclosure. For purposes of this subsection, “disclose” means sell,
manufacture, give, provide, lend, trade, mail, deliver, transfer, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate,
present, exhibit, advertise or offer. 164
The crime carries a prison sentence ranging from three to five years. 165
Although the law has been around for almost a decade, it has been invoked in only a few cases. 166  In a recent case, the defendant
*372  and victim exchanged “unclothed” photos of each other while dating. 167  After their break up, the defendant threatened
to send the victim's nude pictures to her employer, a public school. 168  The defendant followed up on his threat, forwarding
the pictures to the school stating “you have an educator there that is . . . not proper.” 169  The defendant admitted to sending
the pictures. 170  The defendant was convicted for disclosing naked images given with the understanding that they would not
be shared with others. 171
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In 2010, Rutgers University student Dahrun Ravi was charged under the New Jersey statute after he secretly filmed his
roommate Tyler Clementi having sex with a man and watched the live feed with six friends. 172  Clementi committed suicide
after discovering what had happened. 173  The jury convicted Ravi of various counts of invasion of privacy, including the
nonconsensual “observation” of Clementi having sex and the nonconsensual “disclosure” of the sex video. 174
On January 8, 2014, Maryland legislator Jon Cardin proposed a revenge porn bill that resembled the New Jersey approach. 175
The proposed bill bars the disclosure of a person's sexually explicit or nude images “knowing that the other person has not
consented to the disclosure.” 176  The proposed bill included various exemptions, *373  such as the exclusion of images related
to matters of public interest. It reads:
This section does not apply to:
(1) a law enforcement official in connection with a criminal prosecution;
(2) a person acting in compliance with a subpoena or court order for use in a legal proceeding;
(3) a person acting with a bona fide and lawful scientific, educational, governmental, news, or other similar public purpose; or
(4) a voluntary exposure in a public or commercial setting. 177
The proposed Maryland bill treats nonconsensual pornography as a felony with up to five years of jail time and a significant
fine. Wisconsin has proposed a similar bill. 178
A revenge porn bill proposed by New York lawmakers is narrower than New Jersey's or Maryland's approach. It covers
sexually explicit photographs captured consensually as part of an intimate relationship, with the expectation of privacy, and
later disclosed to the public without the consent of the individual depicted. 179  Much like the Maryland proposal, the New York
proposal includes exceptions for law enforcement, legal proceedings, and voluntary exposures made in public. 180
California's newly adopted revenge porn bill has the narrowest coverage of all. Adopted in October 1, 2013, the California law
provides that a party is guilty of disorderly conduct if
[a]ny person who photographs or records by any means the image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person,
under circumstances where the parties agree or understand that the image shall remain private, and the person subsequently
distributes the image taken, with the intent to cause serious emotional distress, and the depicted person suffers serious emotional
distress. 181
*374  The California bill requires that the defendant intend to cause the victim serious emotional distress, a requirement that is
absent from the New Jersey's bill and other proposals. 182  It also demands that the state prove that victims have suffered serious
emotional distress. 183  Its penalty is the weakest, comparatively speaking. Unlike the New Jersey bill and other proposed bills
that classify nonconsensual pornography as a felony, it is a misdemeanour in California punishable by up to six months in prison
and a $1,000 fine (up to one year in prison and a $2,000 fine for a second offense). 184
Franks, Mary Anne 1/7/2016
For Educational Use Only
CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 345
 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 15
IV. The First Amendment Challenges
What of First Amendment objections to revenge porn legislation? Would its criminalization transgress First Amendment
doctrine and free speech values? Is nonconsensual pornography “offensive” speech that must be tolerated or is it instead within
the narrow band of private communications that can be proscribed within the boundaries of the First Amendment? As we argue
in this Part, it is the latter.
A “bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment . . . is that the government may not [censor] the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive” or distasteful. 185  Ordinarily, government regulation of the content
of speech--what speech is about--is permissible only in a narrow set of circumstances. Content regulations have to serve a
compelling interest that cannot be promoted through less restrictive means. Strict scrutiny review, as it is called, is difficult to
satisfy because we distrust the government to pick winners and losers in the realm of ideas. Courts err on the side of caution
before regulating speech because free expression is crucial to our ability to govern ourselves, to discover the truth, and to express
ourselves, among other values. 186  As the Supreme Court famously declared in *375  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, our
society has a “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open.” 187  Hateful and deeply offensive words thus enjoy presumptive constitutional protection. 188
Nonetheless, First Amendment doctrine holds that not all forms of speech regulation are subject to strict scrutiny. Certain
categories of speech can be regulated due to their propensity to bring about serious harms and only slight contributions to
First Amendment values. They include true threats, speech integral to criminal conduct, defamation, obscenity, and imminent
and likely incitement of violence. 189  Courts also have employed “less rigorous” scrutiny in upholding the constitutionality of
penalties for nonconsensual disclosures of private communications, such as sex tapes, on the ground that such communications
are not matters of public concern. 190
*376  A narrowly crafted revenge porn criminal statute that protects the privacy of sexually explicit images can be reconciled
with the First Amendment. For support, we can look to the Court's decisions assessing the constitutionality of civil penalties
under the federal Wiretap Act and lower court decisions on the public disclosure of private fact tort. We can rely on those
decisions because the Court has generally held that the First Amendment rules applicable to criminal law are the same as those
applicable to tort law. 191
Here it is necessary to take note of the erroneous yet oft-repeated claim by opponents of criminalization that, while civil penalties
for revenge porn do not violate the First Amendment, criminal penalties do. This is simply not an accurate statement of First
Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has never held that speech protected by the First Amendment can be restricted
by civil but not criminal law. In fact, its rulings support the opposite conclusion:
What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the
reach of its civil law . . . . The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama
courts here may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute. . . .
Presumably, a person charged with violation of this statute enjoys ordinary criminal-law safeguards such
as the requirements of an indictment and of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. These safeguards are not
available to the defendant in a civil action. 192
The Court was explicitly asked to categorically exclude criminal penalties for truthful reporting about public officials in
Landmark, and it explicitly declined to do so. 193
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*377  In other words, to argue that civil restrictions of nonconsensual pornography are constitutionally acceptable while
criminal restrictions are not is logically inconsistent. While one may take the position that criminalization is unwise or
unnecessary for policy reasons (a position we do not find convincing, as demonstrated above), such a position finds no support
in established First Amendment doctrine. 194
A. Wiretap Decisions
Let us first explore judicial decisions assessing the constitutionality of penalties for the nonconsensual disclosure of truthful,
lawfully obtained information initially acquired illegally. 195  The Court has held that “state action to punish the publication
of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.” 196  In assessing a newspaper's criminal conviction for
publishing a juvenile defendant's name in a murder case, the Court, in the 1979 decision in Smith v. Daily Mail, 197  laid down
the now well-established rule that “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance
then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of
the highest order.” 198  Since then, the Court has consistently refused to adopt a bright-line rule that truthful publications can
never be subjected to civil or criminal liability for “invading ‘an area of privacy’ defined by the State.” 199  To the contrary,
the Court has repeatedly noted that press freedom and privacy rights are both “plainly rooted in the traditions and significant
concerns of the society.” 200
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, 201  for instance, an unidentified person intercepted and recorded a cell phone call between the president
of a local teacher's union and the union's chief negotiator. 202  The conversation concerned the negotiations between the union
and the *378  school board. 203  During the call, one of the parties mentioned, “go[ing] to . . . [[the] homes” of school board
members to “blow off their front porches.” 204  A radio commentator, who received a copy of the intercepted call in his mailbox,
broadcasted it on his talk show. 205  The question was whether the radio commentator could be penalized under the Wiretap
Act for publishing the recorded cell phone conversation. 206
As the Court explained, the case presented a “conflict between interests of the highest order--on the one hand, the interest in the
full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy
and, more specifically, in fostering private speech.” 207  The Court underscored that the “fear of public disclosure of private
conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech.” 208  For the Court, there were free speech interests “on both
sides of the constitutional calculus.” 209  The Court distinguished the free speech interests in certain types of communications.
According to the Court, “some intrusions on privacy are more offensive than others, and . . . the disclosure of the contents of a
private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the interception itself.” 210
The Court struck down the penalties assessed against the radio commentator as unconstitutional because the private
communications concerned negotiations over the proper level of compensation for teachers that were “unquestionably a matter
of public concern.” 211  As the Court underscored, Bartnicki did not involve the nonconsensual publication of “trade secrets or
domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern.” 212  Citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 213  the Court noted that “[w]e
continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between [the] First Amendment
and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant
case.” 214  The Court ruled that the privacy concerns vindicated by the Wiretap Act had to “give way” to “the interest in
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publishing matters of public importance.” 215  The Court held that even though the journalist *379  knew the conversation had
been illegally obtained in violation of the federal Wiretap Act, the First Amendment protected its broadcast. 216
As the Court suggested in Bartnicki, the state interest in protecting the privacy of communications may be “strong enough
to justify the application of” the federal Wiretap Act if they involve matters “of purely private concern.” 217  Free speech
scholar Neil Richards has argued, and we agree, that the Bartnicki rule thus has a built-in exception: regulations regarding
the nonconsensual disclosure of private communications that are not of legitimate concern to the public deserve a lower level
of First Amendment scrutiny. 218  Following that reasoning, courts have upheld civil penalties under the federal Wiretap Act
where the unwanted disclosures of private communications involved “purely private matters.” 219
B. Public Disclosure of Private Fact Tort
Along similar lines, lower courts have upheld the constitutionality of the public disclosure of private fact tort claims where the
private facts disclosed did not concern newsworthy matters, that is, matters of legitimate public interest. 220  The constitutionality
of the privacy tort in cases involving the nonconsensual disclosure of sex videos is well established. 221  In Michaels v. Internet
Entertainment Group, Inc., 222  an adult entertainment company obtained a copy of a sex video made by the *380  celebrity
couple, Bret Michaels and Pamela Anderson Lee. 223  The couple sought to enjoin the defendant from publishing the tape on
the grounds that its publication would mean the commission of the tort of public disclosure of private fact. 224  The court found
for the plaintiffs, reasoning that the public has no legitimate interest in graphic depictions of the “most intimate aspects of”
a celebrity couple's relationship. 225  As the court explained, “sexual relations are among the most private of private affairs,
and that a video recording of two individuals engaged in such relations represents the deepest possible intrusion into such
affairs.” 226
These cases support the constitutionality of narrowly crafted revenge porn laws criminalizing the publication of someone's
sexual images in violation of their understanding that the images would be kept private. The proposed New York bill and
California statute, for instance, protect the interest in individual privacy and, in particular, the interest in fostering private sexual
expression. 227  Sexually themed images constitute psychologically and financially harmful breaches of social norms that satisfy
the “purely private matters” exception in the Smith line of authority. 228  As Neil Richards puts it, “[u]nwanted publication of
a sex video would seem to cause much greater injury, and to be far less necessary to public debate.” 229
The Court's recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps 230  supports the notion that the nonconsensual disclosure of sexual images
constitutes purely private matters deserving less First Amendment protection. 231  Snyder concerned the Westboro Baptist
Church's picketing of a soldier's funeral with signs suggesting that the soldiers' deaths are God's way of punishing the United
States for its tolerance of homosexuality. 232  In 2006, the church's pastor, Fred Phelps, obtained police approval to protest on
public land 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral of a Marine killed in Iraq, Matthew Snyder, would be held. 233  The
protestors' signs read, “God Hates the USA,” “America is Doomed,” “God Hates You,” “You're Going to Hell,” and “Thank
God for Dead Soldiers.” 234  Albert Snyder *381  sued Phelps and members of his church for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 235  The jury award was in the millions. 236
The Supreme Court overruled the decision in favor of the Westboro Baptist Church. 237  As the Chief Justice held, Snyder's
emotional distress claim transgressed the First Amendment because the protest constituted speech of the highest importance--
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views on public matters like “the political and moral conduct of the United States . . . homosexuality in the military, and scandals
involving the Catholic” Church. 238  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, explained that speech on public matters
deserves rigorous protection in order to prevent the stifling of debate essential to democratic self-governance. 239  In contrast,
the Chief Judge explained, speech about purely private matters receives less vigorous protection because the threat of liability
would not risk chilling the “meaningful dialogue of ideas.” 240  The majority pointed to a government employer's regulation
of videos showing an employee engaged in sexual activity. 241  Such regulation was constitutionally permissible because sex
videos shed no light on the employer's operation or functionality, but rather involved purely private matters in which the public
lacked a legitimate interest. 242  As the Court noted in revealing dicta, sexually explicit images exemplify the sort of “purely
private matters” that deserve less heightened protection. 243
Some have suggested that United States v. Stevens 244  ended the question of whether speech can ever be regulated if it
falls outside the categories of unprotected speech such as defamation, obscenity, incitement, or true threats. 245  This is a
misreading of Stevens. In Stevens, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute *382  criminalizing the creation,
sale, or depiction of animal cruelty for commercial gain. 246  The Court rejected the government's argument that animal cruelty
depictions amounted to a new category of unprotected speech. 247  As the Court explained, First Amendment doctrine does
not permit the government to prohibit speech just because it lacks value or because the “ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits
tilts in a statute's favor.” 248  The Court does not have “freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the
scope of the First Amendment.” 249  The Court in Stevens, however, recognized that some forms of speech may be historically
unprotected or entitled to less rigorous protection, even though the Court has not recognized it as such explicitly. 250  But, as the
Court explained, depictions of animal cruelty are not among them. 251  Not so for the public disclosure of private fact tort and
other long-standing privacy regulations. As the Court held in Bartnicki and Florida Star, laws protecting privacy are “plainly
rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society.” 252
Moreover, the Court in Snyder v. Phelps, decided after Stevens, makes clear that the Court has not eliminated long-standing
torts like intentional infliction of emotional distress even though the Court has not explicitly included it as a category of speech
deserving of less rigorous protection. 253  Although the Court has never explicitly held that intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims amount to a category of protected speech, the decision assumed that such claims could be upheld as constitutional
if certain conditions were met--if the expression giving rise to the claims involved purely private matters. 254  In Snyder, the
Court refused to strike down the tort as unconstitutional, much as the Court refused to do so in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell. 255
With this construct in mind, when might revenge porn concern speech on public matters deserving rigorous protection? What
about the application of revenge porn statutes to individuals publishing the sexually explicit images of a public official without
the official's consent?
Consider the infamous images of former Congressman Anthony Weiner. Several women revealed to the press that Congressman
*383  Weiner had sent them sexually explicit photographs of himself via text and Twitter messages on different occasions. 256
Under the reasoning in Snyder, the public arguably has a legitimate interest in learning about the sexual indiscretions of
governmental representatives. On one occasion, Weiner sent unsolicited images of his penis to a college student whom he did
not personally know. 257  His decision to send such messages sheds light on the soundness of his judgment. Unlike the typical
revenge porn scenario involving private individuals who shared their naked photos or permitted trusted others to take them on
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the understanding that the photos would remain confidential, this scenario raises important questions about whether explicit
material disclosed without consent can be considered a matter of public import or otherwise constitutionally protected.
The second set of naked images that Congressman Weiner shared might have different First Amendment implications. In 2013,
Congressman Weiner announced that he would be running in the New York City mayoral race. 258  A woman, Sydney Leathers,
released sexually explicit images of Weiner that he had sent to her while they were having an online affair. 259  To be sure,
the fact that Weiner sent such pictures involves a matter that the public has a legitimate interest in learning about, given that
Weiner is a public figure who had promised that he was no longer engaging in these types of extramarital sexual activities. 260
But does the public have a legitimate interest in the pictures themselves, beyond the question of proof that the pictures were
authentic? In the first scandal, the pictures were proof of a congressman's nonconsensual, potentially harassing conduct vis-à-
vis a stranger. In the second scandal, Weiner shared naked photographs with a trusted intimate. The public interest lies in the
fact that he was having an extramarital, online sexual relationship while running for public office, a fact that could have been
easily demonstrated with the numerous text messages exchanged between Weiner and Leathers or with censored versions of
the pictures in question. We raise this issue not to come down definitely on the matter but to flag *384  the distinction between
the public's legitimate interest in knowing about the naked pictures and in actually seeing them. 261
Another way to understand the constitutionality of revenge porn statutes is through the lens of confidentiality law.
Confidentiality regulations are less troubling from a First Amendment perspective because they penalize the breach of an
assumed duty, not the emotional injury of published words. Instead of prohibiting a certain kind of speech, confidentiality law
enforces express or implied promises and shared expectations. 262
C. Obscenity
Might the Supreme Court find that nonconsensual pornography amounts to unprotected obscenity? Noted First Amendment
scholar Eugene Volokh argues that sexually intimate images of individuals disclosed without consent belong to the category
of “obscenity,” which the Supreme Court has determined does not receive First Amendment protection. 263  In his view,
nonconsensual pornography lacks First Amendment value as a historical matter and should be understood as categorically
unprotected because it is obscenity. 264  Although the Court's obscenity doctrine has developed along different lines with distinct
justifications, nonconsensual pornography can be seen as part of obscenity's long tradition of proscription.
In Miller v. California, 265  the Court set out the following guidelines for determining whether material is obscene:
whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. 266
*385  The Supreme Court provided two “plain examples” of “sexual conduct” that could be regulated: “[p]atently offensive
representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated” and “[p] atently offensive
representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. 267
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Disclosing pictures and videos that expose an individual's genitals or reveal an individual engaging in a sexual act without that
individual's consent could qualify as a “patently offensive representation” of sexual conduct. Such material offers no “serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 268
D. Free Speech Values
Free expression allows individuals to express truths about themselves and the world as they see it. 269  It enables citizens to
make intelligent, informed decisions about self-government. 270  As Justice Brandeis underscored, free speech is “important
not just as an individual right, but as a safeguard for the social processes of democracy.” 271  Being able to express ideas and
to listen to the ideas of others is instrumental to our ability to engage as citizens.
The nonconsensual disclosure of someone's sexually explicit images does little to advance expressive autonomy and self-
governance and does much to undermine private self-expression. Maintaining the confidentiality of someone's sexually explicit
images, shared under the assumption that they would be kept private, has little impact on a poster's expression of ideas. It
contributes little to public conversation essential for self-government. The publication of revenge porn does not produce better
democratic citizens. It does not promote civic character or educate us about cultural, religious, or political issues.
Instead, the nonconsensual disclosure of a person's sexually explicit images chills private expression based on the fear that the
images would be shared with the public at large. Without any expectation of privacy and confidentiality, victims would not share
their naked images. Such sharing may in fact enhance intimacy *386  among couples and their willingness to be forthright
in other aspects of their relationship. Laws restricting disclosure of private information serve important speech-enhancing
functions. In his concurrence in Bartnicki, Justice Breyer noted that while nondisclosure laws place “direct restrictions on
speech, the Federal Constitution must tolerate laws of this kind because of the importance of these privacy and speech-related
objectives,” 272  that is, the interest in “fostering private speech.” 273  He continued, [T]he Constitution permits legislatures to
respond flexibly to the challenges future technology may pose to the individual's interest in basic personal privacy . . . . [W]e
should avoid adopting overly broad or rigid constitutional rules, which would unnecessarily restrict legislative flexibility.” 274
We agree.
V. Recommendations
In this Part, we offer our recommendations to lawmakers working to criminalize revenge porn. Our advice is informed by First
Amendment doctrine, due process concerns, and the goal of encouraging the passage of laws that will deter revenge porn and
its grave harms. In the course of advising lawmakers working on this issue, we have worked closely with civil liberties groups,
including the ACLU. We take their recommendations and concerns seriously. Our recommendations are offered in that spirit.
Civil liberties groups rightly worry that if revenge porn laws “aren't narrowly focused enough, they can be interpreted too
broadly.” 275  Digital Media Law Project's Jeff Hermes has expressed concern that revenge porn laws might criminalize speech
in which the public has a legitimate interest.
Careful and precise drafting can avoid these concerns. These drafting techniques are essential to any effort to criminalize
revenge porn. 276  Criminal laws are vulnerable to constitutional challenges if they are vague or overbroad. Defendants must
have clear notice about the precise activity that is prohibited. Not only does legislation have to give fair warning to potential
perpetrators, it must not be so broad as to criminalize innocuous behavior. Let us explore key features of revenge porn bills
that can help avoid these problems.
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*387  A. Clarifying the Mens Rea
Revenge porn laws should clarify the defendant's mental state. They could require that the defendant knowingly betrayed the
privacy expectation of the person in the sexually explicit image. 277  If that were required, a law could require proof that the
defendant knew that the other person did not consent to the disclosure and that the other person shared the image (or permitted
the image to be taken) on the understanding it would be kept private. 278
The California law seemingly incorporates this notion. The law only punishes intentional privacy invaders. 279  It does not
apply to individuals who foolishly share someone's naked photos with others without knowing they are breaching someone's
confidence. The current California statute only applies “under circumstances where the parties agree or understand the image
shall remain private.” 280  It would not reach people who repost nude images without knowledge or agreement that the image
be kept private.
B. Malicious Motive
The California bill goes too far, in our view, in requiring proof of a malicious motive, specifically that the defendants intended
to inflict serious emotional distress. Other statutes have imposed similar “intent to harass” or “intent to harm” requirements. 281
Such requirements misunderstand the gravamen of the wrong--the disclosure of someone's naked photographs without the
person's consent and in violation of their expectation that the image be kept private. Whether the person making the disclosure
is motivated by a desire to harm a particular person, as opposed to a desire to entertain or generate profit, should be irrelevant.
Malicious motive requirements are not demanded by the First Amendment and, in fact, create an unprincipled and indefensible
hierarchy of perpetrators. What is essential is a statute's goal of protecting privacy, autonomy, and the fostering of private
expression, which the Court has recognized as legitimate grounds for regulation. 282
*388  C. Proof of Harm
Revenge porn statutes might have a better chance of withstanding overbreadth challenges if they require the state to prove that
the victims suffered harm. For instance, the California bill requires the State to prove that the victim suffered emotional harm.
Lawmakers could extend coverage to other types of serious harms described in Part I, such as economic injuries, physical harm,
or stalking. Free speech advocates contend that revenge porn statutes should not criminalize postings that have no impact on
victims. That argument certainly should be considered as lawmakers work on revenge porn bills. 283
D. Clear Exemptions
Revenge porn bills should include exemptions that guard against the criminalization of disclosures concerning matters of public
interest, such as the Maryland, New York, and Wisconsin bills do. 284  They should make clear that it is a crime to distribute
someone's sexually explicit images if and only if those images do not concern matters of public importance. Worded that way, a
law would not apply, for example, to Syndey Leathers, the woman who published former Congressman and mayoral candidate
Anthony Weiner's intimate pictures. Such an exception would help reflect the state of First Amendment doctrine; it would not
alleviate overbreadth problems.
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E. Specific Definitions
Revenge porn statutes must provide clear and specific definitions of certain key terms. For instance, legislators have provided
specific and narrow definitions of “sexually explicit” and “nude” images so that defendants have a clear understanding of the
images covered by the statutes. Maryland, New Jersey, and California include narrow definitions of “sexually explicit” and
“nude” images.
Revenge porn bills should also clarify what lawmakers mean by “disclosure.” Disclosure could mean showing a single other
person, such as sharing a cell phone photograph with another person or sending a person's nude photograph to her employer.
It could, however, have a more narrow meaning: publicity to a wide audience. We believe that a broader definition is in order,
since nonconsensual pornography can have a devastating impact if shown to one other *389  person. Victims have lost their
jobs after perpetrators e-mailed their nude photos to their employers. They experience great shame knowing that an employer
or client has seen their nude photo without their consent. The harms of revenge porn can be as powerful if seen by one person
as by hundreds.
F. Penalty
The ideal penalty for nonconsensual pornography is another contested issue. If the conduct is categorized as a mere
misdemeanor, it risks sending the message that the harm caused to victims is not that severe. Such categorization also decreases
incentives for law enforcement to dedicate the resources necessary to adequately investigate such conduct. At the same
time, criminal laws that are more punitive will face stricter examination and possible public resistance. Although California's
categorization of revenge porn as a misdemeanor sends a weak message to would-be perpetrators and will be a less effective
deterrent than a law like New Jersey's, 285  it may have aided the law's passage.
On March 26, 2014, Congresswoman Jackie Speier (D-CA) announced that she would be sponsoring criminal legislation against
nonconsensual pornography. 286  We support the federal criminal prohibition of nonconsensual pornography because it would
reach online acts that are not covered by state law. 287  Congress could amend the federal cyber-stalking statute, § 2261A, with
the features we suggested above in mind. 288
Such a law would not weaken § 230 protections by exposing search engines, Internet service providers (“ISPs”), and most
content hosts to potential liability. A law drafted as we suggest would not involve any alteration of § 230, nor would it target
most online platforms. It would only prohibit the disclosure of someone's sexually explicit images if the defendant had the
requisite mens rea. The law is, in this and other respects, in harmony with the goals of § 230, which distinguishes between
interactive computer services and information content providers. It is true that Internet *390  intermediaries would not be able
to raise a § 230 defense in the unlikely event of prosecution, but this would not mean that they could not raise any other, more
relevant defenses.
If nonconsensual pornography were to become a federal crime, it would be one of thousands of existing federal crimes for which
no Internet entity can raise a § 230 defense. Search engines and ISPs have had to work around federal criminal law for many
years now, and this fact has not resulted in anything approaching the “death” of the Internet or of the free exchange of ideas.
Federal criminalization of certain forms of online content, far from becoming a burden for search engines, ISPs, and other
entities providing interactive computer services, can actually lead to important and voluntary innovations by signaling the
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seriousness of the damage caused to victims. Google and Microsoft's recent efforts with regard to child pornography are an
admirable case in point. 289
Conclusion
We write this Article at a time of great possibility for the criminalization of nonconsensual pornography. On October 12,
2013, the New York Times editorial board endorsed our efforts as Board Members of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative in
helping legislators craft criminal prohibitions of revenge porn. 290  As the editorial board urged, “Although lawmakers can't
do much to help their constituents with these difficulties, they can work to provide recourse for when exes seek revenge
through un-consensual pornography.” 291  States, along with the federal government, should craft narrow statutes that prohibit
the publication of nonconsensual pornography. Such efforts are indispensable for victims whose lives are upended by images
they shared or permitted to be taken on the understanding that they would remain confidential. No one should be able to turn
others into objects of pornography without their consent. Doing so ought to be a criminal act. In this Article, we have laid
out why this is the case, offered our assessment of recent legislative proposals, and addressed First Amendment concerns. We
*391  hope, in time, to see lawmakers follow our advice and ensure the protection of victims.
Footnotes
a1 Lois K. Macht Research Professor & Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; Affiliate Scholar,
Stanford Center on Internet and Society; Affiliate Fellow, Yale Information Society Project.
aa1 Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. We are grateful to Derek Bambauer, Paul Cassell, Caroline Corbin,
Michele Godwin, Jeff Hermes, Toni Holness, John Humbach, Bill McGeveran, Helen Norton, Neil Richards, David Rocah, Lee
Rowland, Greg Schaeffer, Geoffrey Stone, and Eugene Volokh for their insightful feedback on this project as well as the comments of
the participants of the Wake Forest Law Review symposium, the University of Minnesota Faculty Workshop, and the Free Expression
Network meeting. Our colleagues at the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative and Without My Consent, Holly Jacobs, Charlotte Laws, Colette
Vogele, and Erica Johnstone, have been indispensable to us in thinking through these issues. Frank Lancaster, as always, was a
wonderful assistant and researcher. Much thanks to Shannon Gilreath and Alex Tsesis for organizing the symposium, and to Lee
Denton, Linda Boss, Doug Winn, Sarah Summit, Lucas Garber, and the superb editorial staff of the Wake Forest Law Review.
1 One of us (Citron) spoke to “Jane” just after the post appeared online. Telephone Interview with “Jane” (May 7, 2013) [hereinafter
Interview with Jane] (notes on file with Danielle Citron); Danielle Keats Citron, “Revenge Porn” Should Be a Crime, CNN (Jan. 16,
2014, 3:49 PM), http:// www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/opinion/citron-revenge-porn/ (discussing Jane's experience).
2 Interview with Jane, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
Franks, Mary Anne 1/7/2016
For Educational Use Only
CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 345
 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 24
10 Nonconsensual pornography is also sometimes referred to as “revenge porn,” “cyber rape,” or “involuntary porn.”
11 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 219 (1890). Warren and Brandeis noted that
possible criminal legislation could punish as a felony the publication of “any statement concerning the private life or affairs of another,
after being requested in writing...not to publish such statement” provided the statement does not concern someone's qualifications
for public office or profession or involve a matter of public interest. Id. at 219 n.8.
12 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(i)(1) (2012).
13 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2012).
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012).
15 18 U.S.C. § 1801. This statute's definition of “capture” includes “broadcasting,” which suggests that it could be used to apply to the
nonconsensual disclosure of such images. However, the statute's jurisdiction is very limited, confined to the “the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Id.
16 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy Law Fundamentals (2d ed. 2013); Nat'l Ctr. for Prosecution of Child Abuse,
Voyeurism Statutes 2009, Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n (Mar. 2009), http:// www.ndaa.org/pdf/voyeurism_statutes_mar_09.pdf.
17 See, e.g., Annmarie Chiarini, I Was a Victim of Revenge Porn. I Don't Want Anyone Else to Face This, theguardian (Nov.
19, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/19/revenge-porn-victim-maryland-law-change; Holly
Jacobs, Victims of Revenge Porn Deserve Real Change, theguardian (October 8, 2013, 7:30 AM), http:// www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2013/oct/08/victims-revenge-porn-deserve-protection.
18
.See, generally, Chiarini, supra note 17; Jacobs, supra note 17.
19 Danielle Keats Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 392-95 (2009);
Mary Anne Franks, How to Feel like a Woman, or Why Punishment Is a Drag, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 566, 569-72, 580-84 (2014).
20 Lara Prendergast, Revenge Porn's Ukip Poster Girl Highlights the Dangers of Digital Media, Spectator (Apr. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM),
http:// blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2014/04/revenge-porns-new-poster-girl-highlights-the-dangers-of-digital-media/ (arguing
that if individuals share nude images of themselves they are doing it “with the knowledge that it may one day end up online”); Callie
Millner, Public Humiliation over Private Photos, SFGate, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Public-humiliation-over-private-
photos-4264155.php (last updated Feb. 10, 2013) (quoting revenge porn site operator as saying, “When you take a nude photograph
of yourself and you send it to this other person, or when you allow someone to take a nude photograph of you, by your very actions
you have reduced your expectation of privacy”).
21 See generally sources cited supra note 19 (discussing privacy regulations).
22 See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context 129 (2010); Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Reputation (2007) [hereinafter
Solove, Future of Reputation]; Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy 47 (2008) [hereinafter Solove, Understanding Privacy]; Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 919, 923-25 (2005).
23 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv.
L. Rev. 1765, 1767-74 (2004).
24 See Neil Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1149, 1171 (2005).
25 See Mitchell A. Matorin, In the Real World, Revenge Porn is Far Worse Than Making It Illegal, TPM (Oct. 18, 2013, 6:00 AM),
http:// talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/our-current-law-is-completely-inadequate-for-dealing-with-revenge-porn.
26 Former Boyfriend Pleads No Contest over Sex DVDs, Chesterfield Observer (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.chesterfieldobserver.com/
news/2007-04-25/news/009.html.
Franks, Mary Anne 1/7/2016
For Educational Use Only
CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 345
 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 25
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Cyber Civil Rights Statistics on Revenge Porn, at 2 (Oct. 11, 2013) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Revenge Porn Statistics].
30 Interview with Jane, supra note 1.
31 Caille Millner, Public Humiliation over Private Photos, SFGate, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Public-humiliation-over-
private-photos-4264155.php#photo-4161587 (last updated Feb. 10, 2013, 3:21 PM).
32 Id.
33 Suicide Spurs Web to Regulation in South Korea, Newsweek (Oct. 14, 2008, 8:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
newsweek/2008/10/14/when-words-kill.html.
34 Matt R. Nobles et al., Protection Against Pursuit: A Conceptual and Empirical Comparison of Cyberstalking and Stalking
Victimization Among a National Sample, Just. Q. 1, 20, 22-23 (2012).
35 Revenge Porn Statistics, supra note 29.
36 See, e.g., Katie Smith, What Revenge Porn Did to Me, Refinery29 (Nov. 18, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://
www.refinery29.com/2013/11/57495/revenge-porn #page-2 (“But about two and a half years into the relationship, he started
badgering me about making a video. He got fixated on it...he would ask me, ‘Why don't you want to do it? Don't you trust me?’ He just
kept asking, and got more and more mean about it--'Don't you care about our sex life? Don't you care about things not being boring?”').
37 See, e.g., Chiarini, supra note 7.
38 Second Amended Complaint at 3, 8, Lester v. Mineta, No. C-04-3074 SI (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2006), 2006 WL 104226 (noting violations
of: (1) The Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) The Rehabilitation Act; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (BIVENS); (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3);
and (5) 42 U.S.C. § 1986).
39 Online Reputation in a Connected World, job-hunt 1, 3, 8 (Jan. 2010), http://www.job-hunt.org/guides/DPD_Online-Reputation-
Research_ overview.pdf.
40 Matt Ivester, Lol...OMG! What Every Student Needs to Know About Online Reputation Management, Digital Citizenship and
Cyberbullying 95 (2011).
41 Citron, supra note 1.
42 To be sure, employers refuse to interview or hire individuals for a variety of reasons, including, but not limited to, nonconsensual
pornography. It cannot be denied, however, that revenge porn has a negative impact. Employers have no incentive to hire someone
whose online reputation could jeopardize the esteem of clients and business partners. Their economic incentive is to attract more
business. Avoiding hiring someone who could cast doubt on the firm's credibility is just smart business.
43 See Penelope Trunk, Blog Under Your Real Name, and Ignore the Harassment, Penelope Trunk (July 19, 2007), http://
blog.penelopetrunk.com/2007/07/19/blog-under-your-real-name-and-ignore-the-harassment (explaining that women who write
under pseudonyms miss opportunities associated with blogging under their real names, such as networking opportunities and expertise
associated with the author's name).
44 Ellen Nakashima, Sexual Threats Stifle Some Female Bloggers, Wash. Post, Apr. 30, 2007, at A1.
45 Seth Stevenson, Popularity Counts, Wired, May 2012, at 120, 122.
46 Id. at 120-22.
Franks, Mary Anne 1/7/2016
For Educational Use Only
CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 345
 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 26
47
“Slut-shaming” criticizes women for sexual activity. As noted journalist Emily Bazelon explains, slut-shaming is “retrograde, the
opposite of feminist. Calling a girl a slut warns her that there's a line: she can be sexual but not too sexual.” Emily Bazelon, Sticks
and Stones: Defeating the Culture of Bullying and Rediscovering the Power of Character and Empathy 95 (2013).
48 Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 20).
49 Id. at 21.
50 Id. There are exceptions, of course.
51 See Revenge Porn Statistics, supra note 29.
52 Cyber harassment is often understood to involve the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress accomplished by online speech
that is persistent enough to amount to a “course of conduct,” rather than an isolated incident. Citron, supra note 28, at 6. Cyber stalking
has a more narrow meaning: it covers an online “course of conduct” designed to cause someone to fear bodily harm that would cause
a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety. Id.
53 Molly M. Ginty, Cyberstalking Turns Web Technologies into Weapons; Women Face Violence via Social Media, Ottawa Citizen,
Apr. 7, 2012, at J1.
54 Comparison Statistics 2000-2012, Working to Halt Online Abuse 1, 1 (2014), http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/
Cumulative2000-2012.pdf. WHOA's statistics are gleaned from individuals who contact their organization through their website. The
organization's statistics are not as comprehensive as the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which sponsored a national survey of individuals
who experienced offline and online stalking. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, an estimated 3.4 million people experienced
real space stalking alone, while an estimated 850,000 individuals experienced stalking with both online and offline features. Katrina
Baum et al., Stalking Victimization in the United States, U.S. Dep't Justice 1, 5 (2009), http:// www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/stalking-
victimization.pdf.
55 Jerry Finn, A Survey of Online Harassment at a University Campus, 19 J. Interpersonal Violence 468, 477 (2004).
56 See generally Fed. Trade Comm'n, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (1998), available at http:// www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf. (outlining five of the Fair Information Practice Principles).
57 See 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2012) (addressing that “[i]t is the Policy of Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and
continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers....”).
58 See id.
59 See 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
60 The so-called “third-party doctrine” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests the opposite, but such an understanding is inapt
here for two reasons: one, the Fourth Amendment concerns citizens' relationship to the government, not to other private citizens,
and two, the doctrine has been strongly criticized even within the Fourth Amendment context, especially in the wake of the National
Security Administration's spying scandals.
61 See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change (2010), available
at http:// www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer-protection-preliminary-ftc-
staff-report-protecting-consumer/101201privacyreport.pdf.
62 See id. at vi.
63 See, e.g., id. at vi, 55.
64 Id. at 20 n.49 (quoting Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 Hastings L.J. 877, 881 (2003)).
Franks, Mary Anne 1/7/2016
For Educational Use Only
CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 345
 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 27
65 Nissenbaum, supra note 22, at 144.
66 Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 Hastings L.J. 877, 881 (2003).
67 See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 13.
68 Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Strahilevitz, supra note 22.
69 Solove, Understanding Privacy, supra note 13; Danielle Keats Citron & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Visionary Pragmatism and the Value of
Privacy in the Twenty-First Century, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1107, 1112 (2010) (reviewing Solove, Understanding Privacy, supra note 22).
70 See, e.g., Kubach, 443 S.E.2d at 494. The refusal to recognize the contextual nature of consent may stem from a moral disapproval
of intimate photographs. Some might argue that contextual integrity, as Nissenbaum calls it, is not extended to certain “morally
questionable” content. Nissenbaum, supra note 22. But determinations of what is morally questionable vary widely and are generally
not a suitable basis for law.
71 See, e.g., Sarah Jeong, Revenge Porn Is Bad. Criminalizing It Is Worse, Wired (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:30 AM), http:// www.wired.com/
opinion/2013/10/why-criminalizing-revenge-porn-is-a-bad-idea/.
72 Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignitary Torts from the Constitution, 78 Brook. L. Rev. 65, 65 (2012).
73 See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 477-78 (Ala. 1964) (upholding disclosure claims where a newspaper published
picture of a woman whose body was exposed after her dress was blown up by air jets because there was “nothing of legitimate news
value in the photograph” and because, not only was the photograph embarrassing, it could be properly classified as obscenity given
its offensiveness to modesty and the involuntary nature of the exposure to the public).
74 See generally Daniel J. Solove & Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy Law (4th ed. 2011) (discussing court decisions involving
public disclosure of private information).
75 Taylor v. Franko, No. 09-00002 JMS/RLP, 2011 WL 2746714, at *13 (D. Haw. June 12, 2011).
76 Id. at *4.
77 Id.
78 See id. at *3.
79 Id. at *2.
80 Id. at *5. Not only did the court find that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it
upheld the plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress despite the general requirement of physical injury. The unique
circumstances of the case made clear that the plaintiff's distress was trustworthy and genuine. Id.; see also Doe v. Hofstetter, No. 11-
cv-02209-DME-MJW, 2012 WL 2319052, at *8 (D. Colo. June 13, 2012) (awarding plaintiff damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress where the defendant posted the plaintiff's intimate photographs online, e-mailed them to her husband, and created
fake Twitter accounts displaying them).
81 Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The public has an interest in knowing what the judicial system is doing, an interest
frustrated when any part of litigation is conducted in secret.”).
82 See generally Matorin, supra note 25, (explaining that civil litigation may provide compensation to revenge porn victims but it “won't
remove the photos from the Internet or Google”).
83 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
84 See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (3rd Cir. 1997).
Franks, Mary Anne 1/7/2016
For Educational Use Only
CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 345
 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 28
85 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). A recent letter from the National Association of Attorneys General urged Congress to revise § 230 so that
it cannot preempt state criminal law. The current wording and interpretation of § 230, these Attorneys General maintain, impairs
criminal prosecutions of child trafficking. See Letter From the Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen. to Congress (July 23, 2013), available
at http:// digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1465&context=historical.
86 We are leaving for other work the question of whether § 230's immunity should be narrowed or if the statute in its current form should
be understood as failing to immunize site operators who actively facilitate the posting of revenge porn. One of us, Citron, supports
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Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-49 (1974). As free speech scholar Rodney Smolla puts it, the well-defined categories of speech falling
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See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (finding that the constitutionality of intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims depended on whether the emotionally distressing speech involved matters “of interest to society at large” as determined
by its content, form, and context); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (finding that sexually explicit images were not of
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18, 2014, 11:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/04/18/debunking-the-first-amendment-myths-surrounding-
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[A] suitably clear and narrow statute banning nonconsensual posting of nude pictures of another, in a context where there's good
reason to think that the subject did not consent to publication of such pictures, would likely be upheld by the courts.... [C]ourts can
rightly conclude that as a categorical matter such nude pictures indeed lack First Amendment value.
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